At the moment we're currently undergoing a government crisis in this country. This in itself is nothing remarkable, since governments collapse here with relative frequency and corruption scandals are par for the course. What stood out this time, however, was one of the defences offered by the (now former) Prime Minister when he initially refused to resign.

Amongst those arrested and charged with corruption were three former deputies (the local equivalent of congressmen). These three were members of the government party, but were opposed to the government tax package. Because the government had only a tiny majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the opposition of this trio was enough to prevent the tax reform, which they considered very important, from being passed.

There were all sorts of suggestions about the backhanded reasons the three were holding up the tax reform, with no-one taking seriously the idea that it was based on policy or principle. What's important, though, is the way the government solved the problem. They convinced the three to resign, allowing other deputies to replace them; and in exchange gave each a cushy job with a government agency. The bill passed, and the government was satisfied.

Now, however, they've been arrested and charged with corruption, on the basis that their new jobs were essentially bribes to allow the government to pass its bill. The Prime Minister, in reaction to this, did not say 'These weren't bribes, the new appointments were unconnected with the tax reform bill' as you'd expect a defence to go. Instead, he opted for 'That's not corruption - that's how politics works.'

His essential argument appears to be that party politics is not possible without shady baclhanders done in a smoky room somewhere, and that this should be an accepted part of the democratic process.

Obviously, this didn't go down well with the public, but did he have any sort of point? Is paying people off with a government job just part of the techniques needed to acheive consensus politics? Is this a necessary part of effective government?

That reminds me of a blog piece I read a while ago which argued that US congressional reform to stamp out earmarks (the practice of attaching an extra clause or thirteen to a bill granting funds for congresspeople's pet projects in their states) has probably made Congress even more dysfunctional and intransigent as a body. If you can't buy anybody off, then legislators have no reason not to cling to boneheaded ideological extremism and/or engage in bloody-minded sabotage of the ruling party.

For similar reasons, many political scientists specializing in democratic transitions think that when a country deposes its dictator, it's a better idea to let him go a comfortable retirement abroad than to have him arrested and tried for his crimes. It gives the regime loyalists better motivation to get out of the way quietly if they think they're going to escape with their lives and bank accounts intact.

Power corrupts. The FBI recently swooped down on a State legislator here in California, supposedly as part of a corruption sting. Of course, the legislator and his staff see it as something else.

Once elected, people think they won't be corrupted, but I honestly don't think it's possible for a human being who stays too long or amasses too much power.

This is the one thing that worries me about the idea of international tribunals going after former dictators. On the one hand, you don't want to encourage impunity, and maybe an effective international justice regime would deter people from committing atrocities in the first place. On the other hand, you don't want the world's dictators to think their only options are to rot in a prison cell or cling on to power at all costs.

IMO getting corrupt is an occupasional hazard for politicans. As a politican you often have to make the decision between murky maneuvers that get things done and holding up ideal in a Don Quixotish fashion, that where the rubber meets the road is counterproductive for your cause. And once you start you get on a slippery slope of getting more and more pragmatic. I also suspect some Don Quixotes to not be that much interested in furthering their cause after a while, but keep their base happy and glueing themself to a opposition leader seat.

For that reason it is neccessary to replace politican often, and as far as i can tell, as rule of thumb, countries where the same politicans (irrelevant minor parties without power aside) stay in the game for a very long time tend to be more corrupt, then countries where the political elite is exchanged often.

I can see scenarios, where buying of obstructionists with goverment jobs, can be the lesser evil. If they come from your own party however, the question how they became candidates of your party, and how you intend to prevent further corruptable opportunists to become your parties candidates in future elections, should be raised.

Regarding international tribunals, i think it will work, if the rules are laid down in advance (propably with a transition phase to allow countries to adapt) and are held independent of political convenience. Then a recently exiled tyrant, with a court decision, that he is not guilty of war crimes at least even though he was corruptl, has much better cards at finding an exile and keeping some of his stolen wealth, since taking him in and protecting his assets is much less of a political liability to the host country, then it would be, if he had reigned in the same way, but nobody independent researched it.

The way it has been done recently, with ad hoc decisions to make tribunals, i think it is indeed counterproductive.